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Melissa Atlas
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP) on children’s educational progress, namely whether they are on track with their expected
educational trajectory. It also examines cross-state variation in Medicaid policies and whether these
different policies lead to different effects on the educational variable. With individual-level data from the
Current Population Survey from years 1995 through 2006, along with information regarding each state’s
Medicaid policies, I seek to test the hypotheses that Medicaid/CHIP coverage will improve the likelihood
of an individual being on track with his/her education and that states with qualitatively “better” Medicaid
policies will see stronger positive effects on that educational measure. Using an ordinary least squares
regression model composed of Medicaid/CHIP indicators, demographic characteristics, state dummies,
and state*Medicaid interaction terms, I find that, counter to the past research underlying these hypotheses,
there is evidence that being covered by Medicaid or CHIP has a small, but statistically significant,
negative impact on whether a child is on track with his/her education in a given year. Furthermore, there
is no evidence of a discernible pattern linking qualitatively “better” state Medicaid programs to higher
values for the dependent variable. Further evidence suggests, however, that there may be a cumulative
positive effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage; that is, longer exposure to available public health insurance
programs is shown to have a positive impact on whether an individual is on track with his/her education.
Although the data did not support the original hypotheses, this analysis does provide support for the idea
that there is some relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage and educational variable, and therefore
points to the importance of future research in this area.
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I.

Introduction
Health insurance plays a role in the health of individuals and thus the health of the population

overall. Health plans are commonly viewed as an important resource that can assist in maintaining and
improving individuals’ health and therefore play a role in individuals’ health. Consequently, governmentprovided health plans are a tool for improving the health of the population. Convincing evidence has
shown that health insurance coverage can improve measures of health outcomes, especially for lowincome individuals and families, the population subgroups targeted by expansions of government health
plan coverage. In the United States, Medicaid is the main source of health insurance for such people.
Whether people have health insurance coverage through Medicaid, or whether they have any health
insurance coverage at all, has important bearing on his/her health and well-being.
Access to health insurance may have effects beyond the immediate impact on health.

In

particular, access to health insurance may have positive effects on the education of Medicaid
beneficiaries. These positive may occur through two main channels: better health or indirect effects. In
the first channel, health insurance may improve children’s and young people’s health and may increase
health care utilization, and this may improve their educational performance and their ultimate educational
attainment.

In the second, access to public health insurance may also affect educational variables

indirectly by freeing up resources that would have otherwise been spent on health insurance expenditures,
such as monthly insurance premiums and co-pays for individual health services and procedures. That
may free families to spend more of those resources on education.
In this paper, I seek to study the impact of Medicaid coverage on education for the intended
beneficiaries of these social programs, that is, low-income individuals and families. In particular, how
does coverage by Medicaid affect educational attainment? Because Medicaid policies vary by state, as I
will discuss later, I also seek to determine how different state Medicaid policies affect education. In
particular, do individuals in states that have more generous Medicaid policies, that is, policies that allow
for low-income people up to a higher income threshold to be covered and provide more services,
experience different effects on their educational attainment? Based on available data sources, I have
2

developed an operational definition of the relevant educational outcome. The educational outcome shall
be taken to mean whether an individual is on track with the typical educational trajectory given his/her
age. This educational variable is calculated as follows:
/

5

I subtract 5 in the denominator to account for the first 5 years of life which are typically not spent
in formal schooling. For example, an individual who is 14 years old would be expected to be in either
eighth or ninth grade, which is 9 or 10 years of schooling, based on the course of education in the United
States. For this individual, then, being on track would mean that he/she has 9 years of school out of
his/her age minus 5 (14 – 5 = 9), so his/her educational attainment score would be 1. Using this measure
of education as the dependent variable will allow for comparison of whether individuals are on track with
their educational trajectories. Defining the educational variable in this way will allow me to determine
whether and how health insurance coverage broadly and Medicaid coverage in particular may affect
education outcomes of low-income individuals.
II. Medicaid and CHIP: Institutional Framework and History
Medicaid, enacted as Title XIX of the Social Security Act in 1965, is a joint federal-state program
carried out by state governments to provide financial access to medical care to families and individuals
who would not otherwise be able to afford health insurance and medical care. Medicaid is thus the broad
program of public health insurance for the low-income population in the US. The State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP, later renamed CHIP), established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
enables states to expand health care coverage to non-covered children in families with incomes below
200% of the federal poverty level (FPL) who are ineligible for Medicaid (Swartz, 2009). Medicaid and
CHIP currently provide health coverage to nearly 60 million Americans.

Within this 60 million,

Medicaid and CHIP cover more than 31 million children, accounting for half of all low-income children
in the US (Medicaid.gov). Covering half of all low-income children in the US is an accomplishment,
though one might ask why Medicaid and CHIP do not cover a larger proportion of the targeted
population. One reason is that not all low-income families actually qualify for Medicaid and CHIP,
3

depending on their income and other circumstances. Another significant reason is incomplete take-up of
the program, which I will address later in this section.
States establish and administer their own Medicaid programs, following federal guidelines on the
type, amount, duration, and scope of services. States must cover certain mandatory benefits, such as
preventive care and physician services, and can choose to provide other optional benefits, such as
prescription drugs and rehabilitation therapies (Sommers, Ghose, & Rousseau, 2005).

Medicaid

negotiates the fees paid to providers; and these fees are usually below the fees that private insurance plans
pay (Swartz, 2009).

The federal government provides matching funds, called the Federal Medical

Assistance Percentage, ranging from 50 to 80 percent of Medicaid costs depending on states’ per capita
incomes (Medicaid.gov; Wachino, Rousseau, & Schneider, 2004). In 2006, Medicaid accounted for 1 out
of every 5 health care dollars spent in the nation, paid for 41% of all US births and 50% of all long-term
care costs (for continuing nursing home care for those with chronic conditions), and represented the
largest source of federal grant support to states (Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe, 2007).
Before Medicaid, few low-income people had health insurance and medical care for the poor
generally came from civic and religious groups, and this formed the basis for state and local governments
providing health care to the poor (Swartz, 2009). The Social Security Act of 1935 established a system
for federal funds to match state expenditures and income assistance for dependent children and their
mothers, the poor elderly, the blind, and crippled children. States were in charge of administering these
programs and setting eligibility criteria.

This state variation was the precursor to the variation in

Medicaid eligibility that we have seen across states throughout the history of Medicaid (Swartz, 2009).
Also during this period, public hospitals to care for the poor in urban areas became common.
These public facilities led to a two-tiered system of medical care in which private facilities provided care
to those who could afford it while public facilities provided care to the poor. Another element of
Medicaid’s history was established during this time: paying below-market rates. This payment practice
stems from welfare departments reimbursing private hospitals for care to the poor at rates below those
charged to private patients in places where public hospitals were unavailable (Swartz, 2009).
4

Between 1945 and 1965, private health insurance widely expanded, which stimulated the need for
an alternative to private coverage. The expansion of health insurance at this time occurred mostly
through employment, so those who were uninsured were highly likely to be poor because they didn’t
work, had only intermittent or seasonal employment, or had low-wage jobs (Swartz, 2009). Those who
were most often left out of private health insurance were therefore the poorest individuals; Medicaid
ultimately developed as a way to attempt to remedy this situation.
Between 1984 and 1990, Congress expanded the eligibility criteria for Medicaid through seven
legislative acts (Swartz, 2009). As a result of the eligibility criteria expansions and their continuing
impact, almost 50 million people were covered by Medicaid for at least part of the year in fiscal year
2005, and about half of those Medicaid enrollees, roughly 25.2 million people, were children. The lowincome status of those who are eligible for and are receiving Medicaid benefits has significant
implications for other aspects of their lives such as education, job opportunities, productivity, and
earnings. Providing public health insurance through Medicaid to these low-income individuals thus may
also have implications for those other aspects of their lives.
The Medicaid structure change of 1996 and the introduction of CHIP in 1997 are important points
in the Medicaid timeline. Before this point, Medicaid had been tied to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), so that Medicaid eligibility was heavily dependent upon welfare eligibility. In 1996,
Medicaid was officially decoupled from AFDC. In 1997 the Balanced Budget Act established the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), allowing states to cover uninsured children in families with
incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL) who were ineligible for Medicaid (Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured). These children are considered near-poor – their family
incomes exceed the Medicaid eligibility threshold but are low enough to not be able to afford other health
care coverage. A dramatic increase in the proportion of children eligible for public health insurance
coverage in the form of Medicaid and CHIP followed these policy changes.
The fact that states administer their own Medicaid and CHIP programs means that they can set
their own eligibility criteria (in accordance with federal minimums) and design other eligibility and
5

service rules. This has led to a great deal of variation in Medicaid eligibility across states. Accordingly, a
person who is eligible for Medicaid coverage for a certain medical service in one state might be ineligible
in another state or for another medical service simply based on that geographical location.
Within this state variation in Medicaid programs, it is possible that some states may have
qualitatively better programs than others. This may mean that they have higher income eligibility
thresholds and therefore allow for more people to be covered, or that they cover a wider array of services,
or that they reimburse health care providers at higher rates, and so on. Much of the literature on Medicaid
tends to avoid making value judgments as it is difficult to determine what makes one program better than
another, but there have been reports that attempt to rank states’ programs. A report by Ramirez de
Arellano & Wolfe (2007) ranks each state program based on four categories: eligibility, scope of services,
quality of care, and reimbursement. Eligibility was the most heavily weighted category. In 2007, the top
five states based on overall ranking (in descending order) were Massachusetts, Nebraska, Vermont,
Alaska, and Wisconsin. The five states with the lowest overall scores (i.e. most basic programs) in
ascending order were Mississippi, Idaho, Texas, Oklahoma, and South Dakota (see Appendix A for full
rankings).

Rhode Island ranked #1 in the eligibility category; its Medicaid program covered the

medically needy and other optional groups and had generous FPL requirements, covering the near-poor
and not just the poorest people. While the national eligibility cap by annual income (in 2007) was
$10,849 for working parents, the corresponding figure for Rhode Island was $31,790. Rhode Island also
covered parents through CHIP, which has been found to enhance their children’s access to care (Ramirez
de Arellano & Wolfe, 2007). On the other end of the spectrum, Indiana ranked last in the eligibility
category; its Medicaid program excluded those made poor by extreme medical expenses (the medically
needy) and had very low cut-offs, thereby restricting services to only the neediest. Large numbers of
people in Indiana were therefore excluded from Medicaid just because of where they happened to live.
III. Notes on Differences Among Medicaid Eligibility, Take-Up, and Utilization
The main Medicaid variable used in this analysis is whether an individual is covered by
Medicaid. However, there are multiple layers of Medicaid: eligibility, enrollment (or take-up), and use.
6

It is one thing to rank the quality of states’ Medicaid programs by their eligibility thresholds, scope of
services, and so on. But in considering the quality of a Medicaid program one must also consider the
take-up rate to see whether the intended beneficiaries are actually enrolling in the program. The take-up
rate is measured by how many people, out of the eligible population, actually enroll in the program. This
is an important concept for social programs because if the program exists, but potential beneficiaries are
not participating, then that program cannot deliver its intended impact. Historically, researchers have
paid attention to rules about eligibility for Medicaid and other social programs, but virtually no attention
to how these rules are enforced or made known to people who may be eligible (Currie, 2004).
Consequently, it is difficult to understand program take-up in terms of whether and why people
participate in available programs and in terms of measuring take-up rates for these programs.
There are several factors that contribute to a potential beneficiary not enrolling in Medicaid or
another public assistance program. First, there are often costs associated with participation. One cost is
stigma. Since Medicaid is a means-tested program, eligibles may not participate because of the negative
perception they associate with receiving public assistance; they may see participation as a sign of
weakness or an inability to take care of themselves. Other costs include costs of learning about and
applying for the program, which may deter individuals from using the program (Currie, 2004). In the
case where the potential beneficiary is a child, these transaction costs are most often borne by someone
other than the eligible individual, and this other individual may be less willing to bear the costs of
enrollment and participation for someone else than he/she would be for him or herself (Currie, 2004).
Even more simply, it is possible that some people may not be aware of their own eligibility.
Whether people know about their eligibility and whether they enroll is often dependent upon state and
local governments’ and community organizations’ efforts in improving outreach, reducing stigma,
simplifying enrollment, and retaining eligible enrollees (Selden, Hudson, & Banthin, 2004).
Additionally, research has shown that the costs of enrollment and the likelihood of ignorance of eligibility
may be highest for the families and individuals that are in greatest need (Currie, 2004).
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Beyond understanding why people do or do not participate in Medicaid, understanding take-up
rates and how they vary across states and across time requires knowing both how many people are
covered and how many people are eligible for coverage under each state’s Medicaid and CHIP policies.
While the number of people covered is generally monitored, it is difficult to measure how many people
are eligible for coverage because there are many criteria that determine whether someone is eligible for
Medicaid beyond whether an individual’s family income is above or below the state’s eligibility cutoff.
In their study on changes in Medicaid eligibility and coverage, Selden, Hudson, & Banthin (2004) group
children into three classes of eligibility: welfare-related eligibles1, poverty-related eligibles2, and CHIP
eligibles3.

To conduct this particular study, which focused on changes in children’s eligibility and

coverage in 1996-2002, these researchers ran a simulation based on income rules, assistance unit
composition, and asset tests to determine whether an individual in their sample was eligible for Medicaid
(Selden, Hudson, & Banthin, 2004). It is quite clear that there is no easy way to determine this “number
of eligibles” figure since there are so many detailed conventions across which eligibility is evaluated. As
such, I will address the issues of eligibility and take-up in my sample and analysis, but the main variable
of focus will remain whether an individual reports that they are covered by Medicaid or CHIP.
To begin to answer the question of how Medicaid affects whether an individual is on track with
his/her education, there must be variation within the group of individuals under study. The value
judgments from the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe report tell us about recent variation in Medicaid across
states, and we can also see evidence of this variation simply by looking at the different eligibility
thresholds across states (see Appendix C). As a result of these differences in eligibility rules, otherwise

1

Welfare-related eligibles include children in families eligible for welfare as well as children eligible through
medically needy programs, free Medicaid waiver programs, and separate state-funded programs providing coverage
to immigrant families.
2
Poverty-related eligibles include children born into families with net incomes below the federal poverty guidelines,
children age six in families below 133% or poverty, and those eligible through state expansions covering older
children and those in families with higher incomes.
3
CHIP eligibles include children who are eligible for Medicaid CHIP, separate state CHIP programs, or separate
state-funded programs for immigrant children.
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similar children residing in different states have had differential exposure to Medicaid policies and
differential opportunities for medical care.
Individual variation in Medicaid coverage allows for the analysis of the effect of that Medicaid
coverage on other potentially Medicaid-related outcomes, such as education, for different individuals. In
addition, the variation in Medicaid policies across states may lead to variation in those Medicaid-related
outcomes, such as education, across states as well. Based on the insights provided by the institutional
framework and history of Medicaid and the literature to be discussed in the next section, I hypothesize
that those individuals who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP are more likely to have been on track with
their educational trajectories. I further hypothesize that this effect of Medicaid coverage on education
will vary based on the state in which an individual lives; more specifically, individuals in states with
higher quality Medicaid policies and higher eligibility thresholds will see a larger positive effect on their
educational variable (see section V for formal presentation of hypotheses).
IV. Literature Review
To understand the relationship between education and Medicaid, we must understand the causal
pathway through which health care coverage may impact education based on the available literature.
There is a great deal of literature on the relationship between health insurance coverage and health status,
as well as on the relationship between health and educational outcomes. There has also been some
research on the relationship between health insurance coverage and education, although there is
understandably much less literature on this topic since it is an indirect linkage.
A. Impact of Health Insurance on Health
The first channel through which Medicaid, or health care coverage more broadly, may affect
education is by way of affecting health. This effect on health may occur through the utilization of health
care services that results from having health insurance coverage.

Currie & Gruber (1996), using

demographic and insurance coverage data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in conjunction with
health utilization and status data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), found evidence of a
positive relationship between health insurance coverage and medical care utilization. They found that the
9

expansion of Medicaid eligibility that began in 1984 and continued through the 1990s led to increased
utilization of medical care. They also used two-stage least squares analysis to determine that increases in
the fraction of children eligible for Medicaid in each state (resulting from the expanded eligibility
policies) had a significant negative effect on the child mortality rate, with the effect being strongest for
the poorest families. This suggests that increased eligibility was associated with a sizable and significant
reduction in child mortality, thus indicating that the eligibility expansion led to a reduction in poor health
outcomes for infants and children, especially in poor families.
Li & Baughman (2010) provide more evidence on the relationship between health insurance and
health care utilization. Using data from the National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) to investigate
the links between eligibility for CHIP, health insurance coverage, medical care utilization, and health
outcomes, they found that higher coverage rates translated into increased utilization of the types of
medical care that would be expected to improve children’s health. They found that CHIP significantly
increased health insurance coverage rates for American children and that higher coverage appears to have
translated into increased use of certain types of preventive medical care, including well-child doctor
visits. This suggests improvement in certain child health indicators, such as up-to-date immunizations.
While the authors were not wholly successful in finding significant evidence regarding the effect of the
expanded public health insurance on most available measures of overall health, they did find that the
expanded coverage led to a reduction in deteriorating health, that is, health being worse than in the
previous year, for the 6 through 17-year-old age group. This finding is important for the present study as
it demonstrates that public health insurance does have a positive effect on beneficiaries’ health, which
may later translate into a positive effect on educational achievement.
More research on the relationship of health insurance coverage and health status comes from a
study of public health insurance besides Medicaid in the United States: the National Cooperative Medical
System (NCMS) in rural China. In their study of this public health insurance program, Chen & Gin
(2012) found evidence from raw data showing that, on average, NCMS-insured households had lower
young child mortality and maternal mortality than did non-insured households. Although their analyses
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show that these effects may have been driven by the endogenous introduction and take-up of NCMS,
evidence from the studies of US public health insurance programs, mentioned above, allow us to be fairly
confident that there is a positive link between public health insurance and health outcomes.
B. Impact of Health on Education
The next part of the causal pathway of the effect of public health insurance on education is
through the effect of health on education. Past research has generally shown a positive relationship
between these two variables. That is, better health tends to lead to better educational outcomes. Children
with poor health may be poorly equipped to learn, so alleviating children’s health problems could remove
barriers to success in the classroom (Levine & Schanzenbach, 2009). Case, Fertig, & Paxson (2003), in
their study of the British health and education systems, found that children who experience poor health
reach significantly lower educational attainment; this could be a result poor health making an individual
consistently absent from school or unable to fully engage in schoolwork. In this study, the educational
measure was the passage of the English O-Level exam (taken at age 15), and results indicate that health in
childhood had pronounced effects on educational attainment. Each childhood health condition at age 7
was found to be associated with a 7% reduction in the probability of passing the O-level, demonstrating
that health has a positive impact on education. These authors also examined the effect of health on other
outcomes such as adult health and future earnings. The results of these further empirical analyses
suggested that health status in early and middle adulthood predicted future earnings and that the effect of
poor childhood health on educational attainment was significant for predicting subsequent earnings. This
study helps to demonstrate a key idea for my research: that health status in early childhood has significant
bearing on individuals’ future economic and social well-being.
Other research has found similar results regarding the links between childhood health status and
health and economic outcomes in young adulthood. Contoyannis & Dooley (2010) studied the Canadian
public health insurance system to determine the relationship of physical and behavioral-emotional health
problems in childhood to schooling, health, and labor market outcomes in young adulthood as well as the
role of health status in the intergenerational correlation of economic status. Using data on child and
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family characteristics such as parental income, parental education, and child health in the 1983 Ontario
Child Health Study (OCHS) and socio-economic outcomes such as educational attainment, health,
earnings, wages, and hours of paid work from the 2000 OCHS, least squares estimates indicate that
childhood health problems are negatively associated with educational attainment, especially the
probability of attaining a university degree. These results are consistent with the other research described
here as they also find that bad health has a negative impact on education.
C. Impact of Health Insurance on Education
Health insurance may also have effects on education outside of the channels elaborated above.
First, health insurance might reduce health or private insurance expenditures by the household such that
families can reallocate to education the resources previously devoted to health problems (Alcaraz et al,
2012; Levine & Schanzenbach, 2009). Health insurance could also help households to better cope with
health shocks without interfering with their decisions regarding education. This is important because
household health shocks lead to reductions in the likelihood of completing high school on time, attending
college, and completing a bachelor’s degree (Johnson & Reynolds, 2011). Finally, introduction of
publicly provided health insurance could also reduce precautionary savings and therefore release
additional resources for the household (Gruber & Yelowitz, 1999).
Although there is less literature on the relationship of health insurance coverage and educational
outcomes due to the indirect nature of this linkage, some researchers have explored this relationship.
After all, if Medicaid and other public health insurance plans have effects beyond the immediate impact
on access to health care and health status, it is worthwhile to attempt to understand the mechanisms of
these effects. One study of this link examined how Medicaid expansions starting in 1984 affected
children’s academic performance (Levine & Schanzenbach, 2009). Relying on the cross-state variation
over time and across ages in children’s health insurance eligibility brought about by the Medicaid
expansions, Levine & Schanzenbach investigated the effect of the public insurance expansions on reading
and math test scores. They hypothesized that individuals in states and years with more broadly available
public health insurance would experience a decline in low birth weights and that better health status at
12

birth would be linked to improved educational outcomes. They used a complex system of simulated
instruments to determine whether a child would be eligible for coverage under the rules in each state and
year based on the child’s age and family income. They then ran those simulated responses through a
program that identified their simulated health insurance eligibility at birth, in the years since birth, and at
the time of the study. Their results showed a positive and statistically significant relationship between
eligibility at birth and reading scores. They also concluded that the improvement in reading test scores
associated with children’s public health insurance expansions is at least partially attributable to direct
improvements in children’s health. This result therefore supports the notion that expanding access to
public health insurance may improve educational performance. This study serves as the basis for my
hypothesis that Medicaid coverage has a positive effect on educational achievement. However, as I will
explain, I will be approaching this question from a different angle.
Another important study on the link between public health insurance coverage and educational
outcomes looks at the Mexican public health insurance program, Seguro Popular (SP). Alcaraz, Chiquiar,
Orraca, & Salcedo (2012) used data from a panel of municipalities from 2007 to 2009 to investigate this
relationship. They focused on the effect of the expansion of coverage, as measured by the proportion of
the population in the municipality covered by SP, on standardized test scores for primary school children.
Past research on SP has suggested that SP has a positive impact on health levels and that much of this
effect came through an income channel; that is, the public health insurance program reduced household
expenditures and thus allowed families to reallocate those resources to education-related expenses. The
authors hypothesized that SP could affect academic performance through improved health and through
the aforementioned income channel. Results of their analysis suggested that SP has a positive and
statistically significant effect on children’s academic performance in primary school and that the effect
could be attributed to either improved health or to an income effect, that is, from lower health-related
expenditures. This evidence of the indirect positive effect of public health insurance on academic
performance suggests that there are additional paths through which the public health insurance program
may translate into effects on longer-term outcomes like education, income, and economic development.
13

In considering the above studies, it is important to be mindful that these studies were evaluating
the effects of programs that don’t target education directly. Medicaid is a program of health insurance to
improve access to care for low-income individuals and families, so the effects shown by Levine &
Schanzenbach and those that I’m seeking to show in this paper are indirect effects, and results must be
considered in that vein.

Conclusions regarding the relationship between Medicaid and educational

attainment are likely to be small since they are indirect effects, rather than the explicitly intended effects
of the program. That said, Medicaid as a public health insurance program clearly has potential to impact
outcomes beyond immediate health effects, and I seek to investigate those extended outcomes.
As previously stated, the indirect nature of the link between Medicaid and educational attainment
means that there has not been much research on this subject. The Levine & Schanzenbach study is the
best example I have seen to date. They use individual-level data and focus on the effect of Medicaid
eligibility on educational performance, measured by standardized test scores in 4th and 8th grade. Looking
at standardized test scores provides valuable insight, but I would like to see the effect of Medicaid
coverage on a broader educational outcome. A standardized test score tells us about the student’s aptitude
and performance at one point in his/her life, but not about later years of education and overall educational
trajectory. In addition, the source of variation for the Levine & Schanzenbach study is the change in
eligibility rules over time, which does not account for the state-by-state variation in Medicaid programs.
I will be taking a different and broader view of the question at hand. I will examine how Medicaid
coverage in different states affects education, specifically whether an individual is on track with his/her
education given his/her age. This educational measure will serve as the dependent variable, and the main
independent variables will be those that tell us about Medicaid coverage as it varies across individuals and
states. Specific details of my approach and methodology will be elaborated in section IV.
D. Cross-State Variation in Medicaid-Related Variables
I have hypothesized that there will be differences in the effects of Medicaid coverage on whether
an individual is on track with his/her educational trajectory. There has been research on whether statespecific Medicaid policies lead to significant differences in Medicaid-related variables for low-income
14

children. Long & Coughlin (2002) conducted a study to determine whether states’ Medicaid programs
led to differences in access and use of Medicaid among low-income children on Medicaid. Using data
from the 1997 National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) and controlling for variations in the
characteristics of children on Medicaid and variations in local health care markets, the results of this study
provide evidence of an association between Medicaid spending in different states and access and use
among children on Medicaid in those states. In particular, by comparing thirteen states’ Medicaid
spending per low-income child, Long & Coughlin found that, relative to children residing in states with
the lowest Medicaid spending per low-income child, children on Medicaid in the higher spending states
were more likely to have a usual source of care and a well-child visit. This suggests that children on
Medicaid in states with higher Medicaid spending per low-income child, such as Massachusetts, have
somewhat better access and use than do children in the lowest spending states, such as Texas.
However, the analyses of the relevant data yielded only a moderate association, and also revealed
evidence that children in the highest spending states were also significantly more likely to have an
emergency room visit, which Long & Coughlin suggest may indicate potential problems with access to
care in those states. The weakness of the association between states’ spending on Medicaid per lowincome child and children’s access and use of health care suggests to me that: 1) there is potentially
another way to measure the effect of different state Medicaid programs on the access and use variables or
2) that one must first look at the fundamental Medicaid variable, that is, whether a person is covered by
Medicaid, to find a stronger association of differences in state programs and the access and use variables.
Long & Coughlin’s findings are important for my study because they provide evidence for the idea that
the ability of otherwise similar Medicaid recipients to obtain care may well depend on the state in which
they live. It therefore follows that differences in state Medicaid programs may also lead to differences in
other potentially Medicaid-related variables, such as an individual’s educational trajectory.
E. Other Factors Affecting the Educational Variable
Before addressing the indirect relationship between Medicaid and educational progress, it is
necessary to consider the other factors besides health insurance that may affect this dependent variable.
15

In a review of the empirical research on the links between investments in children and children’s
attainments, Haveman & Wolfe (1995) look at studies focusing on the potential effects on children of
parental choices and neighborhood characteristics.

They found that variables describing parental

characteristics are the most commonly used in studies of children’s educational attainment. Among these,
the most fundamental economic factor is the human capital of parents, measured by the number of years
of schooling attained. This variable was included in virtually all of the studies under review and was
statistically significant and qualitatively important no matter how it was defined.
The income level of the family is the best measure of economic resources devoted to the child
and is often included in studies of children’s educational attainment. Almost all studies in this review
found family income to be positively associated with the educational attainment of the child, and the
income variable is statistically significant in more than half of all cases in which a positive relationship
was estimated. Other parental investment factors that have been found to have statistically significant and
quantitatively large effects on children’s educational attainment include the source of parents’ income
(earned versus public assistance), family structure, the extent of mother’s work, number of geographic
moves during childhood, number of siblings, religiousness, school-related parenting practices, and
presence of reading materials in the home. Accounting for these demographic variables will be important
in my examination of the effect of Medicaid policies across states on educational attainment.
V. Data and Methodology
The main source of data for my study is the Current Population Survey (CPS). This is a crosssectional survey sponsored jointly by the US Census Bureau and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). The survey is conducted monthly on individuals within about 60,000 households representing the
civilian non-institutionalized population. The CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC)
also includes several supplemental questions on subjects such as income, poverty, education, migration,
and more. The US Census Bureau conducts the ASEC over a three-month period, in February, March,
and April, with most of the data collected in the month of March. The ASEC often covers an even broader
sample than does the CPS, surveying individuals within approximately 78,000 households nationwide.
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The ASEC provides supplemental data on poverty, geographic mobility/migration, and work experience;
data also include information on nine noncash income sources: food stamps, school lunch program,
employer-provided group health insurance plan, employer-provided pension plan, personal health
insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, CHAMPUS (supplemental military health care), and energy assistance.
The CPS ASEC thus provides data concerning family characteristics, household composition, marital
status, education attainment, health insurance coverage, citizenship, previous year’s income from all
sources, work experience, receipt of noncash benefits, poverty, program participation, and geographic
mobility.

By collecting this data on an individual level while identifying the state in which each

individual lives, the CPS allows for analysis of education and Medicaid conditions in the nation overall.
I will use data from 1995 through 2006 to cover the period after the most recent policy
expansions within Medicaid as well as the establishment of CHIP. The CPS ASEC includes several
variables regarding Medicaid and education.

It includes each respondent’s level of educational

attainment; for younger respondents, this variable represents their current grade if they are still in school
and for older respondents, their educational attainment is reported as their highest level of schooling or
degree attained. Combining this variable with age allows me to generate the share of the respondent’s life
spent in school, by taking the educational attainment variable as a fraction of age minus five, as explained
in section II, as the main education variable for this analysis. The survey also contains information
regarding whether the respondent is currently (at the time of the survey) covered by Medicaid or CHIP. It
also has information on broader measures of health insurance, most importantly on whether the
respondent is covered by any source of health insurance, either private or public. Determination of
whether an individual has any source of health insurance will allow me to distinguish people who have
Medicaid from people who have non-Medicaid health insurance and to interpret results accordingly.
In addition to these focus variables, the CPS also includes state, gender, age, race, and more.
Additional demographic variables that will be useful as controls are the educational attainment of each of
the respondent’s parents. Importantly, the CPS also includes information on each representative’s total
family income as well as the cutoff, in dollars, for evaluating an individual’s poverty status. This cutoff
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information accounts for family size, number of children, and age of the family householder. I can create
a measure of relative income for each respondent in the sample by taking the family income relative to the
poverty cutoff, and this relative income will serve as a valuable adjusted measure of the income
conditions for each individual, which important to account for when analyzing the educational variable.
There are some limitations of the Current Population Survey for this analysis. First, the fact that
the CPS is a cross-sectional data source limits the analysis to using information on education and
Medicaid/CHIP coverage in a discrete time period – it provides data on what grade a respondent is in in
that survey year, and whether that respondent is covered by Medicaid or CHIP in that survey year. Just
using a respondent’s current grade in school as the educational variable would not tell us anything about
that respondent’s progress or achievement, as age constrains the grade that one could possibly be in. I
developed the dependent educational variable, the share of an individual’s life spent in school (variable
YRSCHL), to address the first issue as it provides a contemporaneous measure of educational progress.
Additionally, the Medicaid/CHIP coverage information is specific to whether the respondent is covered at
the time of the survey, meaning that these data do not allow us to analyze how an individual’s Medicaid
or CHIP coverage in the past affects his/her current educational trajectory. Therefore, we cannot draw
any conclusions about how early childhood health status is connected to Medicaid coverage and how that
may affect the educational variable in the present year. That said, the current Medicaid/CHIP coverage
information is still valuable for gaining insight into the relationship in question.
A second limitation of this data source is that the sample includes children who have potentially
been on Medicaid or CHIP for less than 12 months in the year prior to the survey and children who may
have been covered by other types of insurance over that year and in earlier years of their lives. As we do
not know the full history of each respondent’s health insurance coverage, we are not able to control for
these other sources of health insurance and therefore cannot fully attribute the results solely to the effect
of current Medicaid/CHIP coverage. Nonetheless, the information available from the CPS is valuable in
providing a snapshot of how Medicaid and CHIP coverage may affect educational paths.
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To see differences in Medicaid’s effects across states, I have included statewide Medicaid
information. An important datum that I have employed in constructing sub-samples and variables is the
cutoff for Medicaid and CHIP coverage eligibility, reported as a percentage of the FPL. This varies by
state and may also vary from year to year. Fortunately, there have not been major changes that would be
likely to have significant effects within the timeframe of this study. Therefore, I have chosen to use the
eligibility cutoffs for the 6-16 age group from 2000 as listed in the October 2000 Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured report (see Appendix C).
Based on the eligibility thresholds from 2000 and the relative income variable, I am able to
crudely determine an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid. By comparing an individual’s relative family
income to the eligibility cutoff, I created a qualitative variable to indicate whether an individual’s family
income makes them eligible for Medicaid coverage. This is a crude indicator of eligibility because I have
used the cutoffs from 2000 for all years and because there are other factors besides income, such as a
severe health condition, that may make an individual eligible for Medicaid. However, as long as we bear
in mind that this indicator is somewhat crude, it is still helpful in describing and understanding the
characteristics of the relevant sample. Furthermore, constructing the eligibility indicator allows for
another variable to be considered in this model: an indicator for those who are deemed eligible for
Medicaid but are not enrolled in the program; this qualitative variable will provide insight into how actual
coverage versus eligibility affects whether an individual is on track with his/her education.
My sample consists of individuals between the ages of 6 and 19. After applying the eligibility
indicator and breaking down the states by percentiles according to their ranking from the Ramirez de
Arellano & Wolfe report, some of the characteristics of this sample, based on raw data, are shown below.
Table 1. Sample Characteristics
(ages 6-19)
All States
Number of observations
Average age
Average share of life in
school

Whole Sample

Covered by Medicaid

Eligible, Not Covered

516,066
11.85

103,920
11.05

69,145
12.01

0.876

0.856

0.859

19

Average total family
61,140.90
26,186.79
income ($)
Average relative income
(total family income /
3.318
1.38
poverty cutoff)
Average mother’s
13
11.54
education
(some college, no degree)
(12th grade, no diploma)
Average father’s
13.31
11.43
education
(some college, no degree)
(12th grade, no diploma)
Top 25th Percentile from Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe Rankings
Number of observations
120,613
26,397
Average age
11.86
11.19
Average share of life in
.880
0.863
school
Average total family
65,984.61
28,732.67
income ($)
Average relative income
(total family income /
3.564
1.517
poverty cutoff)
Average mother’s
13.38
11.9
education
(some college, no degree)
(HS diploma or equiv.)
Average father’s
13.7
12.03
education
(Assoc. degree,
(HS diploma or equiv.)
occupational/vocational)
Bottom 25th Percentile from Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe Rankings
Number of observations
122,197
22,316
Average age
11.82
10.96
Average share of life in
.869
0.845
school
Average total family
58,796.08
25,345.25
income ($)
Average relative income
(total family income /
3.205
1.34
poverty cutoff)
Average mother’s
12.88
11.6
education
(some college, no degree)
(12th grade, no diploma)
Average father’s
13.1
11.42
education
(some college, no degree)
(12th grade, no diploma)

17,476.44
0.931
11.75
(HS diploma or equiv.)
11.58
(12th grade, no diploma)
17,941
11.86
0.867
22,586
1.198
12.44
(HS diploma or equiv.)
12.45
(HS diploma or equiv.)
17,871
12.016
0.852
17,776.50
0.947
11.52
(12th grade, no diploma)
11.27
(12th grade, no diploma)

These data tell us about some demographic characteristics of our sample. First, it is noteworthy
that in all states as well as in the percentile sub-samples, both average income and average relative
income among those covered by Medicaid are lower than the overall average, and lower still for those
who are eligible for Medicaid but are not covered. This means that those who are able to but do not
actually participate in Medicaid and CHIP are actually worse off in terms of income than are those
eligibles that do take up the program. This is consistent with the idea that the costs of participating in the
program are highest precisely for those individuals in the greatest need in terms of income (Currie, 2004),
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as discussed earlier. Past literature has also shown that those who are at the lowest income levels may get
the greatest benefit from Medicaid coverage (Currie & Gruber, 1996). The idea of take-up versus
eligibility therefore has significant social implications because it suggests that those who stand to benefit
the most from social programs are often the ones who are least likely to be enrolled in the program.
Another notable aspect of this data description is that, in all sample breakdowns, the average
share of life in school is lower for the populations that are either covered or eligible and not covered by
Medicaid than it is for the overall sample. This indicates that there is potentially a fundamental difference
between those who are covered by and eligible for Medicaid and the rest of the sample. Deeper
quantitative analysis of the data will help to reveal what factors contribute to whether an individual is on
track and if Medicaid coverage is one of those factors.
Using this crude eligibility indicator, I am also able to calculate a rough estimate of each state’s
take-up rate by calculating the ratio of the number of people covered by Medicaid or CHIP in each state
to the number of people deemed eligible for coverage in that state. Calculating this figure (variable
TAKEUP) for each state, applying it to all individuals within that state, and including it in the model will
allow me to get insight into how a state’s take-up rate affects educational trajectories. In this context, the
crude take-up rate may serve as a proxy for the quality of each state’s programs as it represents how
effective a state’s program is at actually covering the intended beneficiaries of the program.
A final variable to be included in this model is each state’s Medicaid payments per enrollee (PPE)
for children (variable MCAIDPPE). This information comes from the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid
and the Uninsured and Urban Institute estimates based on data from the Medicaid Statistical Information
System and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. It is reported in current year dollars and is
calculated as the total spending in each state, by both the state and federal government, on Medicaid for
children, divided by the number of children enrolled in that state’s Medicaid program. This data is only
available starting in 2000, so this variable for the years 1995-1999 are missing. Additionally, this
variable accounts only for state and federal spending on Medicaid, but not on CHIP. As this figure does
not represent the expenditures on each child through CHIP, this variable serves as a proxy for what each
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state may be spending on each child on Medicaid. This variable will serve as another potential indicator
for a state’s generosity in its Medicaid program. Higher Medicaid PPE values may indicate greater
utilization of health care services among enrollees or a wider scope of services covered by the state’s
Medicaid policy, which may have positive impacts on children’s health (Currie & Gruber, 1996; Li &
Baughman, 2010), which may then be indirectly extended to a positive effect on children’s education.
With this wealth of information, it is possible to generate a model that can provide insight into
how Medicaid coverage affects whether a child is on track with his/her education. With the available
data, I will estimate the following equation through ordinary least squares…
1

∗
Where…
YRSCHL = share of each individual’s life spent in school; (current grade)/(age – 5)
HINSCAID = dummy for public insurance coverage (Medicaid or CHIP)
UNINSURED = dummy for individuals who are uninsured
RELINC = relative income; (family income)/(poverty threshold)
FEMALE = dummy variable to indicate gender
BLACK = dummy variable to indicate race
EDUCMOM = mother’s educational attainment
EDUCPOP = father’s educational attainment
TIME = years since 1995
POVERTY = dummy variable to indicate poverty status, i.e. whether an individual is above or
below the federal poverty line based on their household income
ELIGNOTCOV = dummy variable to indicate that a person would be eligible for Medicaid based
on income rules from 2000, but that they were not covered in the previous year
POTENTIALEXP = potential exposure to CHIP; (year – 1997)/age
CHIPEXP = POTENTIALEXP*HINSCAID
TAKEUP = crude measure of Medicaid take-up rate in individual’s home state
MCAIDPPE = Medicaid payments per child enrollee
state dummies = indicator for individuals’ geographic locations
state*HINSCAID = interaction terms indicating effect of Medicaid in a particular state
Beyond the variables discussed above, I have also included other variables to work toward
explaining the variation in children’s educational trajectories and how Medicaid and CHIP coverage may
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be influencing the educational outcome. First, because CHIP was enacted in 1997, it is necessary to
account for this development in the model for the relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage and the
educational variable. I shall account for this in two ways. First, there is each individual’s potential
exposure to CHIP (variable POTENTIALEXP). This can be calculated as the survey year minus 1997,
divided by the individual’s age. This tells us the proportion of the individual’s life that CHIP has been
existence and therefore indicates how long any individual in the sample may have had the opportunity to
actually be covered by CHIP. Second, this potential exposure to CHIP can be applied to those who are
covered by Medicaid or CHIP via an interaction term to see how the potential exposure specifically
affects those individuals in the sample who are actually covered by the program (variable CHIPEXP).
I have also included state dummy variables in this regression equation4. These dummies are
necessary to account for how living in a certain state affects an individual’s educational trajectory. To
account for how Medicaid coverage in a specific state affects the educational variable, I have created
state*Medicaid interaction terms. Taken together, the state dummies will control for non-Medicaid
factors within a state that may affect education, and the interaction terms will provide insight into how
Medicaid or CHIP coverage in a specific state affects education.
Taking all of the dummy variables together, the reference individual or “norm” for this regression is
an individual in West Virginia who is covered by a source of health insurance other than Medicaid or
CHIP, not in poverty, male, and not black. Results will therefore indicate how an individual in this
sample compares to the reference individual.

By estimating this equation, I can come to some

conclusions regarding the effect of Medicaid coverage on the educational variable at hand. To review,
from section II, the hypotheses to be tested in this analysis are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between an individual being covered by Medicaid or
CHIP and whether that individual is on track with their education; that is, being covered by Medicaid

4

In order to avoid issues of perfect collinearity in this regression, West Virginia will be excluded from the regression. This
choice is based on West Virginia’s standing in the middle of the Medicaid eligibility rankings.

23

or CHIP will mean a higher value for the proportion of a child’s life spent in school. In mathematical
terms, I hypothesize that βHINSCAID > 0.
Hypothesis 2: Following hypothesis 1, there is a positive relationship between an individual’s
Medicaid/CHIP coverage and the educational variable in each state, or if there is not a positive
coefficient on the state*Medicaid interaction term, then the magnitude of a negative coefficient is
smaller than that the magnitude of the positive coefficient on the Medicaid/CHIP coverage indicator
such that the sum of these coefficients for each state is positive. That is, βstate*Medicaid > 0 for each
state, or if βstate*Medicaid < 0, | βstate*Medicaid| < | βHINSCAID|.
Hypothesis 3: The pattern in the sums of βHINSCAID and βstate*Medicaid for each state will align with the
rankings from the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe such that those states that are ranked higher will
have a more positive sum of the relevant coefficients.
VI. Results
Table 2 presents summary statistics for a selection of variables for the sample of children age 6 to 19.
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

YRSCHL

162430

0.875594

0.100636

0

2.2

HINSCAID

162430

0.152244

0.359258

0

1

UNINSURED

162430

0.192391

0.394179

0

1

RELINC

162430

3.575689

3.501533

-1.712825

58.92812

FEMALE

162430

0.487361

0.499842

0

1

BLACK

162430

0.12036

0.325383

0

1

EDUCMOM

137400

12.942

2.927215

0
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EDUCPOP

111435

13.28898

3.285422

0

22

POVERTY

162430

20.88915

4.624819

10

23

ELIGNOTCOV

160366

0.07708

0.442498

0

1

TAKEUP

160366

0.728153

0.275203

0.25

1.447761

MCAIDPPE

112474

1863.245

824.5364

932

12662

The correlation between the Medicaid or CHIP coverage variable (HINSCAID) and the
dependent educational variable (YRSCHL) is 0.0170. This suggests that, before controlling for all factors
5

The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series reports that values in all years for the total family income variable may be negative.
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besides Medicaid and CHIP coverage that affect whether an individual is on track with his/her
educational trajectory, there is a small positive relationship between Medicaid or CHIP coverage and the
educational variable. (See Appendix D for full correlation matrix.) Controlling for the other factors that
affect the educational variable (variables RELINC, FEMALE, EDUCMOM, EDUCPOP) will provide
deeper and different insight into this relationship.
In running an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on equation 1 from above, the Medicaid
payments per child enrollee variable (MCAIDPPE) has a coefficient of nearly zero and is highly
insignificant with a t-statistic of only 0.46. As such, there is no conclusive evidence that Medicaid
payments per child enrollee explain the variation in whether an individual is on track with his/her
education.

Also, as the data for this variable are only available starting in 2000, including this

information means dropping all observations from the years 1995-1999. I have therefore chosen to
remove this variable from the model6 in order to include all relevant observations from 1995-2006.
Additionally, including both the mother’s and father’s education variables damages the sample size
because both pieces of information are not available for all individuals. Since these two variables are
highly correlated (with a correlation of 0.6822, see Appendix D for full correlation matrix), I have chosen
to include just the mother’s education variable. The regression equation is now as follows:
2

∗

6
An additional issue with the Medicaid payments per child enrollee data is that it does not account for differences in costs of
living across states. Because of these differences, the value of a dollar spent on a child Medicaid enrollee is different in different
states; for example, $1000 in California will not provide as much in terms of health care coverage as it would in, say, Nebraska.
The lack of adjustment for costs of living could also explain why this variable does not provide significant information for
explaining the variation in the educational variable.
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A check for heteroskedasticity is necessary to get reliable results with efficient standard errors. A
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity indicates that there is evidence of non-constant
variance in this sample. Running a regression of the squared residuals on individual variables from the
dataset reveals that age is likely the source of the heteroskedasticity as age has a statistically significant
positive coefficient of 0.009, and the age variable is used in constructing the dependent educational
variable as well as the POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP variables in this model. This means that there is
a larger amount of variation in the educational outcome for older individuals. To correct for this nonconstant variance in age, I will employ White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
Running an OLS regression on equation 2 with White’s heteroskedasticity consistent (robust)
standard errors yields the following results for the independent variables besides the state dummies and
the state*Medicaid interaction terms (see Appendix E for full results).
Table 3. Main Regression Results
Variable

Coefficient

Robust Standard Error

T-statistic

HINSCAID

-0.0418212***

0.0060535

-6.91

UNINSURED

-0.0084231***

0.0007579

-11.11

RELINC

0.0005024***

0.0000772

6.5

FEMALE

0.0146567***

0.0005035

29.11

0.0001228

0.0009371

0.13

EDUCMOM

0.0032621***

0.0001144

28.52

7

TIME

-0.0124789***

0.0006478

-19.26

POVERTY

-0.0051086***

0.0014035

-3.64

ELIGNOTCOV

-0.007261***

0.0011637

-6.24

POTENTIALEXP

0.2134941***

0.0110474

19.33

CHIPEXP

0.0298535***

0.0043684

6.83

TAKEUP

0.003917

0.0029161

1.34

Constant

0.8506558***

0.0038541

220.72

BLACK

N = 135618
R2 = 0.0504
F(109, 135508) = 55.95
***Statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance (two-tailed)

7

The time trend in this regression is controlling for changes over time that may impact whether children are on track with their
education; the negative coefficient therefore indicates that there are some circumstantial changes occurring over time that make
the people in the later survey years less likely to be on track with their education than those in earlier survey years.
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These regression results show that the crude take-up rate variable is not statistically significant,
with a t-statistic of only 1.05. The crude take-up rate is therefore not informative in this model of an
individual’s educational trajectory. This is likely due to the difficulty of properly calculating the take-up
rate, so a more precise measure of take-up would potentially provide more informative results.
Although not every individual state dummy variable is independently significant (see Appendix
E), the state dummies are jointly significant at the 0.05 level, with an F-statistic of 28.23. The state
dummies control for what is specific to each state that isn’t captured by other variables. This may include
policy differences in the age cut-offs for when children start school or differences in customs regarding
when parents start sending children to school. Similarly, while not every state*Medicaid interaction term
is independently significant, the state*Medicaid interaction terms are jointly significant at the 0.05 level
of significance with an F-statistic of 3.90. These interactions terms are important for understanding the
effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage in a particular state, and will be discussed later in this section.
Before addressing the main independent variable, analysis of the coefficients on the demographic
variables confirms the soundness of the dependent educational variable. Relative income, the female
indicator variable, and mother’s education level are all statistically significant and have the sign that one
would expect based on past research (Haveman & Wolfe, 1995). The positive relationship between
relative income and the educational variable indicates that family income has a positive impact on
education; a child in a family with higher income is more likely to be on track with his/her education.
Further, the coefficient on the female indicator is significantly positive at the 0.01 level of significance,
consistent with the notion that females tend to have better educational progress and performance than
equivalent males. The coefficient on the race indicator is reported as insignificant. Although this may be
surprising, it is consistent with past literature, since many studies have found that race alone is not
associated significantly with educational attainment when family income and other characteristics are
included in models (Haveman & Wolfe, 1995). The coefficients on mother’s educational attainment is
also significantly positive at the 0.01 level of significance, which is again consistent with other research
showing that a higher level of parental education means a better educational outcome for the child.
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Finally, the poverty indicator is significantly negative at the 0.01 level of significance. This negative
relationship indicates that poverty has a negative impact on a child’s educational trajectory. Despite using
the unconventional educational variable in my model, results for the demographic variables are consistent
with past research. We can therefore conclude that this unconventional education variable behaves
similarly to educational variables used in other literature, such as standardized test scores.
The main variable of interest in this model is HINSCAID. This variable indicates whether an
individual is covered by either Medicaid or CHIP, with a value of 1 indicating that the individual is
covered by Medicaid or CHIP, and zero indicating otherwise. The negative coefficient of -0.0418
suggests that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is less likely to be on track with his/her
education than the reference individual, someone who is covered by another form of insurance. This
suggests that, after controlling for poverty status and other demographic characteristics, Medicaid/CHIP
coverage is potentially further accounting for the low-income status of those who are covered. A
potential reason for this negative effect may be related to the issue of coverage versus utilization of health
care coverage; that is, that those who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP are not necessarily using their
health insurance benefits. In this case their Medicaid or CHIP coverage is yet another indicator of their
low-income status rather than a potential indicator of improved access to health care or improved health
status. Since other sources of non-Medicaid/CHIP health insurance, such as private health insurance,
often cover a wider array of health-related costs and reimburse health care providers at higher rates than
do Medicaid and CHIP (Swartz, 2009), this could translate into better health outcomes and therefore
better educational outcomes for individuals covered by non-Medicaid health insurance. The value of
-0.0418 indicates that being covered by Medicaid or CHIP sets an individual back in his/her educational
trajectory by 4.18%. This is not a large enough percentage to set most individuals back by a whole year,
but it is a significant impact on children’s educational trajectory nonetheless. This negative relationship
runs counter to Hypothesis 1, and this result will be further discussed later in this section.
Similarly to the Medicaid/CHIP coverage indicator potentially serving as an indication of
something about the beneficiaries’ low-income status, the statistically significant coefficient of -0.007 on
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ELIGNOTCOV tells us about potential beneficiaries’ low-income status. In accordance with the idea that
those who are eligible for but not actually enrolled in Medicaid or CHIP are often those that are in the
most dire need (Currie, 2004), this negative coefficient indicates that those who are eligible but not
covered by Medicaid or CHIP are likely those children who have a combination of the worst health status
and the lowest income levels. These characteristics may have a negative impact on whether a child is on
track with his/her education. Alternatively, this coefficient may be reflecting that a child has ill-informed
parents who have not enrolled their eligible children in the program.
The coefficient on the uninsured indicator is -0.008, which demonstrates a negative relationship
between uninsurance and whether an individual is on track with his/her education. This means that,
similarly to someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP, someone who is uninsured is less likely to be
on track than someone who is covered by a non-Medicaid/CHIP form of health insurance. This is not a
surprising result given that it is highly likely that someone without any health insurance would be lacking
access to necessary health services, which could mean an adverse impact on his/her health.

The

coefficient of -0.008 on the uninsured indicator is smaller in magnitude than the coefficient of -0.0418 on
the Medicaid/CHIP indicator, so being uninsured sets someone back in his/her educational trajectory by
0.8%, whereas being on Medicaid or CHIP sets someone back by 4.18%. This difference in magnitude
indicates that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is even less likely to be on track with his/her
education than someone who is uninsured. One possible explanation may be that being uninsured does
not always indicate that a person is low-income; after all, the correlation between relative income and the
uninsured indicator is relatively weak at only -0.13 (see correlation matrix in Appendix D). Alternatively,
this could indicate that children who are uninsured are relatively healthy, thereby mitigating the negative
impact of uninsurance on the educational variable through having better health status. While this is a
notable result, it is one for which the explanation is beyond the scope of this paper.
The regression of equation 2 tests how the educational variable is different for someone who is
covered by Medicaid/CHIP as compared to anyone who is covered by non-Medicaid/CHIP health
insurance. This result is not surprising as it is reasonable to believe that an individual on Medicaid would
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be less likely to be on track than someone who is covered by another source of health insurance,
especially if that insurance is private8. To see how the educational variable is different for someone who
is covered by Medicaid/CHIP as compared to others in the poor and near-poor universe, we can restrict
the sample to those who are poor and near-poor. This universe shall include people whose relative
incomes fall below 400% of the poverty cutoff so as to capture all those who are in poverty and who are
relatively poor, but not considered to be in poverty based on the federal poverty cutoff. Imposing the
relative income restriction on the model and removing the relative income variable9, the regression with
White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors yields the results shown in table 4.
Another restriction that I can employ to get at the population most likely to be affected by
Medicaid/CHIP is to restrict the sample to only those who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP and those
who are uninsured. Imposing this restriction,10 the regression with robust standard errors yields the
following results for the Medicaid/CHIP indicator and the demographic variables.
Table 4. Regression Results for Restricted Universes

Variable

Poor and Near-Poor Universe
(RELINC ≤ 400% FPL)
Coefficient
Robust SE
T-Statistic

HINSCAID

-0.0389172***

0.0064832

-6.00

UNINSURED

-0.0082383***

0.0009005

-9.15

RELINC
FEMALE

Medicaid/CHIP-Covered and Uninsured
Universe
Coefficient
Robust SE
T-Statistic
-0.0340471***

0.0077786

-4.38

N/A

N/A

0.0013239***

0.0002821

4.69

0.0158141***

0.0006591

23.99

0.0172108***

0.0010475

16.43

-0.0001182

0.0010786

-0.11

-0.0007803

0.001615

-0.48

EDUCMOM

0.0038849***

0.0001479

26.27

0.0042781***

0.000213

20.08

POVERTY

-0.0046478***

0.0014299

-3.25

-0.0050074***

0.0018979

-2.64

Constant

0.8508453***

0.0050728

167.73

0.8592466***

0.0105282

81.61

BLACK

N = 87381
R2 = 0.0526
F(108, 87272) = 37.70

N = 40734
R2 = 0.0603
F(108, 40624) = 21.72

***Statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance (two-tailed)

8

Private insurance is most often employer-sponsored, so having private health insurance indicates higher and more stable
income, which is likely positively related to the education variable. If an individual is covered by private health insurance that is
not employer-sponsored, then he/she must have the disposable income to purchase that insurance, so the same logic follows.
9
Because the sample is being restricted based on the relative income variable, there will necessarily be less variation in the
relative income and poverty status data, so the variables are removed from the regression.
10
Because the sample is being restricted based on the uninsured variable, there will necessarily be less variation in the uninsured
variable data, so the variable is removed from the regression.
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After imposing the first restriction, the Medicaid/CHIP indicator variable still has a negative
coefficient. This indicates that people who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP are less likely to be on track
with their education as compared to others in the poor and near-poor universe who have other sources of
insurance, as well as compared to otherwise insured people in the unrestricted sample. The magnitude of
this coefficient is slightly smaller than in the regression for the unrestricted sample, setting individuals
covered by Medicaid or CHIP back by 3.89% of their lives as compared to 4.18%. Although this is a
small difference, it shows that, compared to people who are otherwise insured in the sample of poor and
near-poor individuals, those covered by Medicaid/CHIP are slightly less negatively impacted in their
educational trajectories than they are when compared to anyone who is otherwise insured, regardless of
income. This is an unexpected result as it provides evidence to the contrary of Hypothesis 1.
After imposing the second restriction, the coefficient on the Medicaid/CHIP indicator is again
negative. This indicates that people who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP are less likely to be on track
with their education as compared to others in the sample who are uninsured. As with the previous
restriction, the magnitude of this coefficient is smaller than in the regression for the unrestricted sample,
setting individuals covered by Medicaid or CHIP back by 3.4% as compared to 4.18%. This is consistent
with the small negative coefficient on the uninsured indicator in the main regression (see table 3)
discussed above. These results suggest that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is even less
likely to be on track with his/her education than someone who is uninsured. Again, one possible
explanation may be that being uninsured does not always indicate that a person is low-income or
unhealthy. It is not surprising that restricting the sample to these universes doesn’t reveal very different
results. Restricting the sample controls for the ways in which people are different in terms of their
relative income, poverty status, and insurance coverage.

Assuming that I have already correctly

controlled for these variables in my model, restricting the sample will not yield different results.
Another way to analyze the data for the research question at hand is to change the structure of the
dependent variable. Since the share of life in school variable (YRSCHL) is non-linear, it is somewhat
difficult to interpret what the coefficient means as the effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage will be different
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for people at different ages. That is, a 16-year-old being 4.18% behind in his/her education is very
different from a 7-year-old being 4.18% behind.

For ease of interpretation, I have also created a

dependent variable to indicate whether a person is on track. This variable (ONTRACK) indicates whether
a person is on track in school relative to his/her age group. An individual is considered to be off track
(and given a value of 0) if his/her share of life in school is less than one standard deviation below the
average share of life in school for that age group. Using this on-track indicator tells us about the
likelihood of a child being on track, and regressing this variable yields the following results (excluding
results for state dummies and state*Medicaid interaction terms).
Table 5. Regression Results with ONTRACK Dependent Variable, Unrestricted Universe
Variable

Coefficient

Robust Standard Error

T-statistic

HINSCAID

-0.1140302***

0.0198864

-5.73

UNINSURED

-0.0264565***

0.002013

-13.14

RELINC

0.0012273***

0.000143

8.59

FEMALE

0.0245382***

0.0012095

20.29

BLACK

-0.0077051***

0.0024391

-3.16

EDUCMOM

0.0086309***

0.0002849

30.3

TIME

-0.0393622***

0.0013275

-29.65

POVERTY

-0.0158557***

0.0040685

-3.9

ELIGNOTCOV

-0.0238182***

0.0031885

-7.47

POTENTIALEXP

0.6579016***

0.0212576

30.95

CHIPEXP

0.0771499***

0.0115762

6.66

TAKEUP

0.01092

0.0071462

1.53

Constant

0.8931469***

0.0091827

97.26

N = 135618
R2 = 0.0530
F(109, 135508) = 40.89
***Statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance (two-tailed)

After changing the structure of the dependent variable into this dummy indicator of whether an
individual is on track, we do not see much change in the relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage
and whether an individual is on track with his/her education. The coefficient on the main variable,
HINSCAID, is significantly negative. This means that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is
more likely to be off track in his/her education, which is consistent with the results from the regression on
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the YRSCHL variable. The magnitude of the coefficient on HINSCAID in this regression is -0.114,
which suggests that someone who is covered by Medicaid or CHIP is 11.4% more likely to be off track
than someone who is otherwise insured. Other results in this regression reinforce the previous results; the
coefficients on the demographic variables are still as expected. For example, the coefficient on mother’s
education (EDUCMOM) is significantly positive, meaning that someone whose mother has a higher level
of educational attainment is less likely to be off track.

This consistency of results holds for nearly all of

the variables shown above in table 5, so it is clear that changing the structure of the dependent variable
from the share of life spent in school to the on-track indicator does not yield substantially different results.
Now that multiple iterations of sample restrictions and of the dependent variable have all
provided similar results, I shall return to focusing on the original unrestricted regression. To understand
the full effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage, we must not only analyze the effect of the HINSCAID
variable on its own, but also via the state*Medicaid interaction terms, as these are constructed using the
HINSCAID indicator. There are a handful of states for which the state*Medicaid interaction term is
significantly positive, as noted in the table below. This indicates that being on Medicaid or CHIP in these
particular states mitigates the negative impact of just being on Medicaid or CHIP at all. However, the
total effect of Medicaid coverage in one state is determined by the sum of the coefficient on the
HINSCAID variable and the coefficient on the state*Medicaid interaction term for that state. Testing the
linear combinations of the HINSCAID coefficient and each of the state interaction terms from equation 2
(in the unrestricted sample of all children ages 6-19) yields the following results:
Table 6. Linear Combinations of Coefficients on HINSCAID and State*Medicaid Terms
State
Alabama
Alaska+
Arizona
Arkansas
California×
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia

Sum of Coefficients
-0.0529215***
-0.0233709***
-0.289119***
-0.039995***
-0.0204813***
-0.260784***
-0.0394877***
-0.0557355***
-0.0325314***

Robust Standard Error
0.007861
0.0059062
0.0066749
0.0078023
0.0030366
0.0091191
0.0064407
0.0112506
0.0077998

T-statistic
-6.73
-3.96
-4.33
-5.13
-6.74
-2.86
-6.13
-4.95
-4.17
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Florida
-0.0302319***
0.0048776
Georgia
-0.0418681***
0.0063184
Hawaii
-0.0289277***
0.0072267
Idaho
-0.0283674***
0.006351
+
Illinois
-0.0248393***
0.0046021
Indiana×
-0.0171621**
0.0077035
Iowa
-0.0460582***
0.008362
Kansas
-0.0322037***
0.0078703
Kentucky
-0.0381319***
0.0061351
Louisiana
-0.0690629***
0.0087109
Maine
-0.0413595***
0.0055622
Maryland
-0.0356297***
0.009041
×
Massachusetts
-0.0136993**
0.005471
Michigan
-0.0365672***
0.0052416
Minnesota×
-0.0175278***
0.0061682
Mississippi
-0.0428505***
0.0071842
Missouri
-0.0305208***
0.0082136
Montana+
-0.0238378***
0.0071657
Nebraska
-0.04153***
0.0093663
Nevada+
-0.0166373
0.0108482
New Hampshire
-0.0374184***
0.0107966
New Jersey+
-0.0234046***
0.0061795
New Mexico×
-0.0219781***
0.005354
New York
-0.0362817***
0.0038304
North Carolina
-0.0363043***
0.0062135
North Dakota
-0.0277527***
0.0069535
Ohio
-0.0303021***
0.0046783
Oklahoma
-0.0394631***
0.0078724
×
Oregon
-0.013736*
0.007444
Pennsylvania
-0.034523***
0.0052573
Rhode Island
-0.0289161***
0.0072502
South Carolina
-0.0503599***
0.0080223
South Dakota
-0.0361198***
0.0074074
Tennessee
-0.0317342***
0.0075404
Texas
-0.0335325***
0.004146
Utah
-0.0282336***
0.0064851
Vermont
-0.0418212***
0.0060535
Virginia
-0.0369084***
0.0088017
Washington×
-0.0199157***
0.0059272
West Virginia
Manually omitted to avoid collinearity
Wisconsin+
-0.0245847***
0.0065912
Wyoming
-0.0467062***
0.0073861
×
***Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
State*Medicaid interaction term is
**Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed)
significant and positive at 0.01 level
+
*Significant at 0.10 level (two-tailed)
State*Medicaid interaction term is
significant and positive at 0.05 level

-6.20
-6.63
-4.00
-4.47
-5.40
-2.23
-5.51
-4.09
-6.22
-7.93
-7.44
-3.94
-2.50
-6.98
-2.84
-5.96
-3.72
-3.33
-4.43
-1.53
-3.47
-3.79
-4.10
-9.47
-5.84
-3.99
-6.48
-5.01
-1.85
-6.57
-3.99
-6.28
-4.88
-4.21
-8.09
-4.35
-6.91
-4.19
-3.36
-3.73
-6.32
independently
independently
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These results show that all of the linear combinations of the HINSCAID coefficient and the
state*Medicaid coefficients are negative. This suggests that, consistent with the HINSCAID variable
being negative on its own, being covered by Medicaid/CHIP in a given year in any state makes an
individual less likely to be on track with his/her education, as compared to someone who is otherwise
insured and is above the poverty line. This result runs counter to Hypothesis 2. The original hypotheses
were based on the idea that Medicaid coverage improves health for those who are covered and thereby
improves educational outcomes, as well as on the idea that Medicaid coverage may free up financial
resources and thereby allow parents to spend less on health expenses and more on other expenses, such as
those related to childcare and education. However, these negative linear combinations of the coefficients
tell us otherwise. As stated earlier, the negative coefficient here is perhaps telling us about three possible
ideas: 1) the Medicaid indicator may be capturing something more about the low-income status of those
who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP that is not already being explained by the other control variables,
2) the potential discrepancy between coverage and utilization, and 3) the potential discrepancy in quality
and scope of services between Medicaid/CHIP and other sources of health insurance.
Despite expectations that high-ranking states in the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe (2007) report
would have more positive (or less negative) effects from Medicaid/CHIP coverage, there is no discernible
state pattern in the sizes of these linear combinations, so this analysis does not find support for
Hypothesis 3.

For example, the sum of the coefficient on HINSCAID and on the state*Medicaid

interaction term for Massachusetts is the least negative out of all of the statistically significant coefficient
sums with a sum of -0.0136993, so if Hypothesis 3 holds, this would be an indication of Massachusetts
having a higher standing in the Medicaid program quality rankings. This pattern seems to hold at first
glance, as Massachusetts is ranked #1 overall and #8 for eligibility. The initial match-up of a high quality
program with a small negative impact falls apart when we look at the next least negative sum; this sum is
-0.013736 for Oregon, which is ranked #12 overall and #19 for eligibility. Further, the next least negative
sum of coefficients is for Indiana at -0.0171621, but Indiana is ranked at #45 overall and #51 for
eligibility. The lack of pattern may well be attributed to the inherently imperfect nature of the Ramirez de
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Arellano & Wolfe rankings, which are an attempt at making value judgments of states’ Medicaid
programs and may not truly capture the “quality” of a program in terms of its ability to improve health
outcomes for beneficiaries. Second, the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe rankings were constructed based
on eligibility, reimbursement, scope of services, and quality of care, with eligibility being the most
heavily weighted criterion. In determining the effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage on the educational
variable, it may ultimately be more useful to look at the scope of services and quality of care, as these
factors may have a more direct effect on health status than does eligibility, and that effect on health status
is pertinent to the educational outcome11. Third, because the results for the effect of Medicaid/CHIP
coverage went against my first two hypotheses, it follows that the original hypotheses about the higher
state rankings meaning more positive effects on the educational variable will also not hold.
Due to the cross-sectional nature of these data, these negative results tell us about the current
effect on education of an individual being covered by Medicaid or CHIP in a given year, while it is likely
that there are more cumulative effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage. Without data tracking individuals
over time, we cannot know whether someone was covered by Medicaid or CHIP earlier in his/her life and
how that affects his/her educational trajectory in the survey year. But because CHIP was introduced as an
eligibility expansion in 1997, it is possible to measure the potential exposure of an individual to the wider
eligibility for CHIP, represented in the model by POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP. The positive and
statistically significant coefficient of 0.213 (see table 3) on the POTENTIALEXP variable indicates that
the greater the proportion of a child’s life that CHIP has been in existence, regardless of whether that
child is actually covered by CHIP or Medicaid, the more likely that individual is to be on track with
his/her education. Because a child’s potential exposure to CHIP increases over time, this indicates a
cumulative effect of the existence of CHIP for all individuals in the age 6-19 sample.
In conjunction with the positive coefficient on POTENTIALEXP, there is also a positive and
statistically significant coefficient of 0.03 (see table 3) on the CHIPEXP variable. This variable is
11
Upon brief observation, there is no immediately apparent pattern in matching the states with the least negative coefficient sums
to the highest ranking states for these categories. However, it is possible that further empirical examination of these categories
could show otherwise, so this may be an avenue for further research.
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constructed as an interaction term of POTENTIALEXP*HINSCAID and therefore provides insight into
the effect of the proportion of a child’s life that CHIP has been in existence on the educational variable
specifically for people who are currently covered by Medicaid or CHIP. The positive coefficient on
CHIPEXP indicates that those who are covered by Medicaid or CHIP and have had longer potential
exposure to CHIP are even more likely than others in the sample to be on track with their education. To
further illustrate this point, the sum of the coefficients on these two variables is 0.243, and a test of this
linear combination yields a t-statistic of 21.18, making this value highly statistically significant. Again,
as a child’s potential exposure to CHIP increases over time, this suggests a cumulative effect of the
existence of CHIP. The negative coefficient on the Medicaid/CHIP coverage variable is therefore likely
indicating that current Medicaid/CHIP coverage has a negative impact on the educational variable at one
point in time, but the positive coefficients on POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP indicate that CHIP
coverage may have a positive cumulative impact on the educational variable over time rather than at just
one point in a child’s life. Further, the sum of the coefficients on these two variables and the negative
coefficient on HINSCAID is 0.202, and a test of this linear combination yields a t-statistic of 15.98. This
means that the positive combined cumulative effect of Medicaid/CHIP coverage indicated by the
POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP variables is big enough to outweigh the negative contemporaneous
effect of being on Medicaid/CHIP in a given year.
These results also suggest a possible positive externality of CHIP’s existence – beyond the
potential exposure to CHIP improving the educational outcome just for those who are actually covered by
Medicaid or CHIP (shown by the CHIPEXP interaction term), exposure also improves outcomes for
anyone in the sample (shown by POTENTIALEXP). This possible externality may be thought of as
similar to the positive externalities associated with other facets of health care, such as immunizations.
When someone gets vaccinated for a certain disease, that person is himself less likely to contract that
disease, and by extension, other people in that person’s environment are also less likely to contract that
disease (Boulier, Datta, & Goldfarb, 2007). The same logic may follow for CHIP; greater access to
health insurance coverage for low-income children, signified by a greater proportion of one’s life during
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which CHIP has been in existence, may make those children healthier, and by extension, make others
around them healthier as well and therefore more likely to be on track with their education.
These results were not what this study sought out to discover and firmer conclusions require data
more specific to the individual, but the possibility of cumulative effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage is
notable and shall be important for further investigating the relationship between Medicaid/CHIP and
whether an individual is on track with his/her education.

Furthermore, the possible existence of

cumulative rather than incremental effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage may help explain the overall
negative impact of Medicaid/CHIP coverage found here, as well as the lack of pattern for the state-bystate effects of Medicaid and CHIP and how they line up with the Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe rankings.
VII.

Discussion and Conclusions
This analysis finds evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that health insurance coverage for

children through Medicaid and CHIP improves the likelihood that those children are on track with their
education. There were two main causal pathways underlying the hypothesis: 1) Medicaid coverage may
improve health, and that improvement in health may improve the educational variable; 2) Medicaid being
a publicly-funded program could free up financial resources for parents to reallocate from health expenses
to education-related expenses. The lack of evidence to support this hypothesis likely signals a break in
the causal pathway. It is possible that Medicaid coverage indeed does not improve health or that, if it
does improve health, that health improvement does not have a strong impact toward improving the
educational variable. It is also possible that having Medicaid or CHIP coverage in a given year does not
free up enough financial resources to make a positive impact on the educational variable, or that if it does
free up financial resources, that those resources are not redirected to expenditures that could increase the
likelihood that a child is on track with his/her educational trajectory. Additionally, Medicaid/CHIP
coverage in one year cannot change the situation if a person was already off track before being covered.
Beyond the evidence not supporting the main hypothesis of this study, there is statistically
significant evidence to the contrary. This analysis shows that currently being covered by Medicaid or
CHIP makes children less likely to be on track with their education than people who are otherwise
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insured. This is the case both when the sample includes children from all income levels, when the sample
is restricted to the poor and near-poor, thus focusing on those who could potentially benefit from
Medicaid and CHIP coverage, and when the sample is restricted to only those covered by Medicaid/CHIP
and those who are uninsured. The negative impact of Medicaid/CHIP coverage on whether an individual
is on track may be indicative of several ideas. First, the Medicaid/CHIP coverage could be signaling
something about the low-income status of the beneficiary that is not already being explained by the
relative income and poverty indicator variables. This would be especially pertinent if there is a gap
between someone being covered by Medicaid or CHIP and whether that person actually uses the health
care services available through that insurance. For there to be an improvement in the educational variable
as a result of the Medicaid-better health-better education pathway, there must first be that direct impact of
Medicaid coverage on health outcomes; if an individual is covered by Medicaid or CHIP but is not
utilizing those health services, improved health outcomes are unlikely, and the causal chain falls apart.
Having Medicaid or CHIP coverage may then be pointing to the fact that the individual in question is at a
low enough income level to be eligible for coverage, but if the coverage goes unused, the variable is
picking up residual effects of the low-income status not already captured by the poverty indicator.
Second, the Medicaid/CHIP coverage could be an indicator of potentially lower quality of care
and/or fewer available health services covered by Medicaid and CHIP policies. Medicaid and CHIP pay
health providers at rates below the private market rate. Also, there is a history of low-income people
being treated at facilities with smaller funds (Swartz, 2009). Therefore, those who are covered by these
public forms of health insurance may be receiving health services inferior to those received by people
who are otherwise insured. The differences in the quality and scope of care provided by different types of
insurance and the impact that those quality differences can have on health may also explain the
differences that we see in the indirect effect of the type of health insurance on the educational variable.
These results are contrary to those in other studies on the relationship between public health
insurance coverage and educational outcomes. Where Alcaraz, Chiquiar, Orraca, & Salcedo (2012) and
Levine & Schanzenbach (2009) find that public health insurance coverage improved children’s academic
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performance, I find that current health insurance coverage through Medicaid and CHIP has a negative
impact on children’s progress in school. One reason for the difference between the results in the present
study and those in the Alcaraz et. al study may stem from the differences in the characteristics of the
public health insurance programs – Seguro Popular is intended to provide universal public health
insurance coverage free of charge to Mexican families, while Medicaid is limited to providing health
insurance to the poor. Because SP is intended to be completely free of charge and because it is intended
to ultimately cover the whole population, it may be more likely to lead to an income effect such that
families have more resources to spend on education-related expenses than Medicaid would have.
The differences in the methodologies of my research and of Levine & Schanzenbach’s research
are most likely the cause of the opposing results. First, their educational variable was standardized test
scores, which get at academic performance, whereas my educational variable does not tell us about
measured performance, but about a child’s ability to stay on track. It is likely that there is a difference in
the effect of Medicaid and CHIP coverage on these different educational variables. Second, Levine &
Schanzenbach used their cross-sectional data to create a system of simulated instruments to project back
into each individual’s past and predict whether a person would have been eligible for coverage under the
rules in each state based on the child’s age and family income, then ran those simulated responses through
a program that would identify their simulated health insurance eligibility at birth, in the years since birth,
and at present depending on when they were born. Their results showed a positive statistically significant
relationship between eligibility at birth and reading scores. These researchers essentially formulated their
own longitudinal measure of Medicaid/CHIP coverage to look at Medicaid coverage in the past as it
relates to academic achievement in the present, whereas my approach focuses on both aspects of the
relationship in the present. As such, the Levine & Schanzenbach study gets at a cumulative effect of
Medicaid coverage at birth on current academic performance, while my data allows mostly for analyzing
the incremental effect of Medicaid coverage at one given point in time. A similarity between my results
and those of the Levine & Schanzenbach study, however, is that the potential exposure to CHIP variable
provides some insight into the potentially cumulative effects of public health insurance coverage through
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Medicaid and CHIP. The joint effect of the POTENTIALEXP and CHIPEXP variables in this analysis is
greater in magnitude than the effect of the HINSCAID variable, so it is possible that the potentially
cumulative effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage outweigh the negative effects of Medicaid/CHIP coverage
in a given year. This is consistent with the findings of the Levine & Schanzenbach study, as they point to
the effect of coverage at birth over time, i.e. a cumulative effect, as the driving factor behind the improved
academic performance. This similarity of results points to the importance of the idea of a cumulative
impact of Medicaid/CHIP coverage in analyzing educational outcomes. I did not originally set out to find
effects of exposure to a public health insurance policy on whether children are on track with their
education. This finding, coupled with the evidence of cumulative effects from Levine & Schanzenbach,
therefore warrants further investigation and suggests a topic for future research in the field of the indirect
effects of public health insurance coverage through Medicaid and CHIP.
This analysis also does not find any evidence to support the hypothesis that states with
qualitatively “better” Medicaid and CHIP policies have more positive effects on the educational variable.
This could be due to the specific methodology of the rankings system in the Ramirez de Arellano &
Wolfe report, as well as to the idea that a state Medicaid or CHIP program deemed to be “high quality”
does not necessarily translate into high take-up of the program or, even further, into high usage of the
benefits of the program. However, past research (Long & Coughlin, 2002) has shown that there is a
relationship between different states’ Medicaid policies (represented by their per capita Medicaid
expenditures) and access and use of health care for Medicaid beneficiaries. Long & Coughlin found that
those states with higher Medicaid spending per low-income child saw increased access to and use of
health care services, and this increase in utilization may be expected to translate into a positive impact on
health. I chose to use Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe’s system of Medicaid policy quality rankings in this
analysis so as to get a more nuanced look at program quality, beyond just taking higher spending
measures to indicate quality. The lack of evidence of a pattern in this study suggests either that such a
relationship between supposedly higher quality state Medicaid programs and health care utilization and
health outcomes that we see in the Long & Coughlin study does not extend to the educational variable
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here or that such a pattern truly does not exist. As stated earlier, the lack of pattern may be due to the
consequences inherent in employing a value-based system of quality rankings, or to the way in which the
rankings focus on the types of people and services that are available for coverage rather than on the
number of people who actually participate in the program and on the types of services that are actually
used by those participants. In addition, it is possible that if a study could capture the cumulative effects of
program quality, that is, how the program quality in the past affects health and educational outcomes in
the present, a more discernible pattern could be revealed.
To better understand the relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage and whether an
individual is on track with his/her educational trajectory, it is necessary to have information on
individuals’ health insurance coverage history. This would be best provided by a longitudinal survey
tracking individuals’ health insurance coverage and medical care, health status, and educational progress
over time. Alternatively, a cross-sectional data source that contains information on respondents’ past
health insurance coverage could provide similar insight into the relationship in question.

To my

knowledge, there is currently no data source available that provides all this information, so it is currently
difficult to get at the core of the cumulative effects of public health insurance coverage for children’s
education. Further research in this area must therefore depend on the data sources that are already
available and must continue to develop economic approaches to find evidence of indirect effects of
Medicaid coverage accordingly. If further research of this nature continues to find significant indirect
effects of Medicaid and CHIP on educational variables, then perhaps the subject warrants the creation of
such a survey to provide the full gamut of necessary data.
Regardless of the specifics of the results of this study and of past research, there is evidence that
there is indeed a relationship between Medicaid/CHIP coverage and whether an individual is on track
with his/her education, although the results of this study were not as expected. This is an important
insight, as it suggests that there are economic and social effects of public health insurance coverage that
extend beyond the immediate impact on health. This is a topic area ripe for further research, especially in
light of recent developments in the American health care system with the Affordable Care Act. Will the
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further expansion of coverage to more Americans have different effects on educational variables? Will
children who are born later and who will therefore have more exposure to the provisions of the
Affordable Care Act see different effects than those studied in earlier years? If this study were to be
repeated with data from, say, 2017, would we still see a negative relationship between Medicaid/CHIP
coverage and the educational variable in a given year? In the meantime, further research on past data
would be useful in gaining a better understanding of the potential indirect benefits and consequences of
Medicaid and CHIP coverage, and such research could ultimately be useful in predicting how the
relationship may pan out in the future.
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Appendix A: Overall Medicaid Rankings – from Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe (2007)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
33
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

State
Massachusetts
Nebraska
Vermont
Alaska
Wisconsin
Rhode Island
Minnesota
New York
Washington
New Hampshire
Hawaii
Oregon
Maine
California
Maryland
Montana
Iowa
North Carolina
Connecticut
Kentucky
Utah
Delaware
Michigan
Arizona
West Virginia
Florida
District of Columbia
Louisiana
Ohio
New Mexico
North Dakota
Illinois
Pennsylvania
Wyoming
Kansas
Georgia
Virginia
Arkansas
New Jersey
Nevada
Missouri
Alabama
Colorado
South Carolina
Indiana
South Dakota
Oklahoma
Texas
Idaho
Mississippi

Score (out of 1000)
645.9
625.5
616.1
609.9
606.8
600.0
591.2
560.2
550.0
548.9
547.1
544.0
528.4
525.7
523.3
512.5
510.2
506.6
505.8
496.6
480.9
476.8
475.8
474.5
474.4
467.7
462.9
457.3
451.7
447.0
443.2
439.6
437.8
437.8
432.4
426.1
423.5
415.7
410.7
405.0
379.1
376.3
375.7
364.0
357.2
352.6
336.7
335.5
325.2
317.8

*Since Tennessee does not have any practitioners paid under fee-for-service, it lacks indicators for the reimbursement category. Because of the lack of comparability
with other states, there is no way to rank this state in terms of reimbursement. It is also impossible to compute an overall score for Tennessee.

Appendix B: Eligibility Category Rankings – from Ramirez de Arellano & Wolfe (2007)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
33
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

State
Rhode Island
Vermont
New York
Washington
California
Minnesota
District of Columbia
Massachusetts
Wisconsin
Hawaii
Louisiana
Maryland
Nebraska
Connecticut
Michigan
New Jersey
New Hampshire
Maine
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Oklahoma
Georgia
Arkansas
North Carolina
Iowa
Kansas
Florida
Tennessee
Utah
Kentucky
New Mexico
Montana
Alaska
West Virginia
Ohio
Illinois
Missouri
North Dakota
Wyoming
South Carolina
Colorado
Virginia
Delaware
Idaho
Texas
Nevada
South Dakota
Arizona
Mississippi
Alabama
Indiana

Score (out of 350)
296.8
283.7
264.8
260.9
258.9
254.5
248.5
247.6
246.6
245.0
228.7
226.4
220.1
218.7
217.0
216.8
211.3
210.0
204.9
198.3
193.3
190.9
190.0
188.9
186.0
183.0
182.4
175.2
167.4
162.8
160.1
159.7
159.3
157.5
144.9
143.6
141.8
139.8
133.7
132.7
131.8
131.0
127.1
117.1
110.3
108.5
101.1
95.5
92.6
91.6
90.6
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Appendix C: State Income Eligibility Guidelines (% of Federal Poverty Line) – Medicaid for Children Age 6-16, July 2000
State
Eligibility Cutoff
Alabama
100
Alaska
200
Arizona
100
Arkansas
200
California
100
Colorado
100
Connecticut
185
Delaware
100
District of Columbia
200
Florida
100
Georgia
100
Hawaii
200
Idaho
150
Illinois
133
Indiana
150
Iowa
133
Kansas
100
Kentucky
150
Louisiana
150
Maine
150
Maryland
200
Massachusetts
150
Michigan
150
Minnesota
275
Mississippi
100
Missouri
300
Montana
100
Nebraska
185
Nevada
100
New Hampshire
185
New Jersey
133
New Mexico
235
New York
100
North Carolina
100
North Dakota
100
Ohio
200
Oklahoma
185
Oregon
100
Pennsylvania
100
Rhode Island
250
South Carolina
150
South Dakota
140
Tennessee
100
Texas
100
Utah
100
Vermont
300
Virginia
100
Washington
200
West Virginia
100
Wisconsin
185
Wyoming
100
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Appendix D: Full Correlation Matrix
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Appendix E: Regression Results (Equation 2) for State Dummies and State*Medicaid Interaction Terms
Variable

Coefficient

Robust Standard Error

T-Statistic

AL

-0.0051047

0.0028607

-1.78

AK

0.0003945

0.0029326

0.13

AZ

0.0024682

0.0028117

0.88

AR

9.32E-06

0.003368

0

CA

0.0241335***

0.0019665

12.27

CO

0.0030381

0.002895

1.05

CT

0.0125283***

0.002957

4.24

DE

0.0031534

0.0031407

1

DC

0.011003**

0.0043571

2.53

FL

0.0021178

0.0022572

0.94

GA

-0.0116394***

0.003029

-3.84

HI

0.0261768***

0.0031759

8.24

ID

0.0021603

0.0031844

0.68

IL

0.0083523***

0.0022989

3.63

IN

-0.0171325***

0.0027575

-6.21

IA

-0.0045821*

0.0025304

-1.81

KS

-0.0052623*

0.0029375

-1.79

KY

0.000936

0.0030371

0.31

LA

-0.000333

0.0034845

-0.1

ME

0.0010575

0.0029007

0.36

MD

0.019291***

0.0032301

5.97

MA

0.0091587***

0.0025967

3.53

MI

0.003967*

0.0023257

1.71

MN

-0.0047643

0.0031567

-1.51

MS

-0.011697***

0.0030531

-3.83

MO

-0.0010589

0.0033914

-0.31

MT

-0.0099795***

0.0029552

-3.38

NE

-0.0003576

0.0030862

-0.12

NV

0.0127935***

0.0031122

4.11

NH

-0.0063336**

0.0026125

-2.42

NJ

0.0127963***

0.0024495

5.22

NM

0.0073702**

0.0033709

2.19

NY

0.0183735***

0.0021848

8.41

NC

0.0013427

0.0025891

0.52

ND

-0.0071652***

0.002515

-2.85

OH

-0.0042887

0.0026851

-1.6

OK

-0.0082653**

0.0032532

-2.54

OR

0.0043757

0.0029445

1.49

PA

-0.0027333

0.002294

-1.19

RI

0.0130822***

0.0033141

3.95

SC

0.0065992**

0.0031511

2.09

SD

-0.0136067***

0.0026304

-5.17
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TN

0

(omitted)

TX

-0.0053891**

0.0023184

-2.32

UT

0.003102

0.0025037

1.24

VT

0

(omitted)

VA

0.0027731

0.0027696

1

WA

-0.0021184

0.0031066

-0.68

WI

-0.0020391

0.0027855

-0.73

WY

-0.0048769*

0.0026188

-1.86

mcaidAL

-0.0111002

0.0095971

-1.16

mcaidAK

0.0184504**

0.0081313

2.27

mcaidAZ

0.0129093

0.008673

1.49

mcaidAR

0.0018262

0.0095204

0.19

mcaidCA

0.02134***

0.0062937

3.39

mcaidCO

0.0157429

0.0105991

1.49

mcaidCT

0.0023336

0.0084862

0.27

mcaidDE

-0.0139143

0.0125353

-1.11

mcaidDC

0.0092898

0.0095219

0.98

mcaidFL

0.0115893

0.0074131

1.56

mcaidGA

-0.0000469

0.0084172

-0.01

mcaidHI

0.0128935

0.0091479

1.41

mcaidID

0.0134538

0.0084549

1.59

mcaidIL

0.0169819**

0.0072465

2.34

mcaidIN

0.0246591***

0.0094711

2.6

mcaidIA

-0.004237

0.0100247

-0.42

mcaidKS

0.0096175

0.0096146

1

mcaidKY

0.0036893

0.0083025

0.44

mcaidLA

-0.0272416***

0.0102997

-2.64

mcaidME

0.0004617

0.0078272

0.06

mcaidMD

0.0061916

0.0106473

0.58

mcaidMA

0.028122***

0.0078811

3.57

mcaidMI

0.005254

0.0076878

0.68

mcaidMN

0.0242934***

0.0083316

2.92

mcaidMS

-0.0010292

0.0091005

-0.11

mcaidMO

0.0113005

0.0099505

1.14

mcaidMT

0.0179834**

0.0090869

1.98

mcaidNE

0.0002912

0.0109449

0.03

mcaidNV

0.0251839**

0.0121134

2.08

mcaidNH

0.0044029

0.012133

0.36

mcaidNJ

0.0184166**

0.0083476

2.21

mcaidNM

0.0198432***

0.0077282

2.57

mcaidNY

0.0055395

0.0067496

0.82

mcaidNC

0.0055169

0.0083383

0.66

mcaidND

0.0140685

0.0089023

1.58

mcaidOH

0.0115191

0.0073154

1.57
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mcaidOK

0.0023581

0.0096779

0.24

mcaidOR

0.0280853***

0.0093003

3.02

mcaidPA

0.0072982

0.0076423

0.95

mcaidRI

0.0129051

0.0090044

1.43

mcaidSC

-0.0085387

0.0097496

-0.88

mcaidSD

0.0057014

0.0092395

0.62

mcaidTN

0.010087

0.0093056

1.08

mcaidTX

0.0082888

0.0068977

1.2

mcaidUT

0.0135876

0.0085218

1.59

mcaidVT

0

(omitted)

mcaidVA

0.0049128

0.010384

0.47

mcaidWA

0.0219055***

0.0081227

2.7

mcaidWI

0.0172365**

0.0085915

2.01

mcaidWY

-0.0048849
0.0092333
***Significant at the 0.01 level of significance
**Significant at the 0.05 level of significance
*Significant at the 0.10 level of significance

-0.53
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